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We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol for
an arbitrary source whose averaged states are basis-independent, a condition that is automatically
satisfied if the source is suitably designed. The proof is based on the observation that, to an
adversary, the key extraction process is equivalent to a measurement in the σˆx-basis performed on
a pure σˆz-basis eigenstate. The dependence of the achievable key length on the bit error rate is the
same as that established by Shor and Preskill for a perfect source, indicating that the defects in the
source are efficiently detected by the protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution is an ingenious application
of quantum mechanics, in which two remote parties (Al-
ice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through the
transmission of quantum signals. In the BB84 protocol
[1], Alice sends a key bit to Bob by preparing a qubit
in one of two conjugate bases and Bob measures the
qubit in one of the two bases; the eavesdropper Eve, who
does not know the basis chosen by Alice or by Bob, can-
not collect information about the key without producing
a detectable disturbance. This protocol, when suitably
augmented by classical error correction and privacy am-
plification, is provably secure against any attack by Eve
allowed by the laws of quantum physics [2,3,4,5].
Though security can be proven without imposing any
restriction on Eve’s attack (other than the requirement
that she has no a priori information about the basis
used), it is necessary to place conditions on the perfor-
mance of the source and detector employed in the pro-
tocol. In the Shor-Preskill proof [5], it is assumed that
any flaws in the source and detector can be absorbed into
Eve’s basis-independent attack. The proof by Mayers [2],
however, applies to a more general setting: although the
source is perfect, the detector has never been tested and
is completely uncharacterized. Indeed, the detector could
be under the control of Eve’s collaborator Fred. Fred is
unable to send messages to Eve, but he knows Bob’s ba-
sis and can adjust the measurement performed by the
detector accordingly. Still, as Mayers showed, Fred can-
not fool Alice and Bob into accepting a key that Eve
knows, as long as the efficiency of the detector is basis
independent. Since a real device could have an indefinite
number of degrees of freedom, no test can fully char-
acterize it; therefore proving security in the case of an
uncharacterized apparatus provides comfort to a highly
suspicious user of the key distribution scheme.
In this Letter, we present a simple proof of the security
of the BB84 protocol that applies to a setting opposite
to that considered by Mayers: the detector is perfect and
Fred controls the source. We will, however, place one im-
portant restriction on Fred’s attack — the source must
not leak any information to Eve about the basis chosen
by Alice. That is, the state emitted by the source, av-
eraged over the values of Alice’s key bit, is required to
be independent of Alice’s basis. Our proof applies to
faulty sources that are notably more general than those
encompassed by the Shor-Preskill proof; to give just one
example, it applies to a source that performs perfectly
when Alice chooses the σˆx-basis but that rotates the
qubit when Alice chooses the σˆz-basis. Nevertheless, our
proof shows that secure key can be extracted from sifted
key at the same rate established by Shor and Preskill.
Our proof combines insights gleaned from both the
Mayers proof and the Shor-Preskill proof. Following
Mayers, we analyze the information about (Bob’s) key
collected by Eve in the case where Alice and Bob are
using different bases. Following Shor and Preskill, we
bound Eve’s information by observing that Bob could
have performed error correction to remove any entangle-
ment with Eve’s probe before executing the measurement
that extracts his final key. The core of our proof is the
observation that a single quantum circuit computes Bob’s
final key in the σˆx-basis and reverses the damage inflicted
by Eve if the error rate is small in the σˆz-basis. Using
the same method, we can also prove security for the case
of an uncharacterized detector, allowing a more general
source and establishing a higher rate of key generation
than in the proof by Mayers.
Before proceeding to the proof, let us specify in more
detail our models of the source and detector. Alice pre-
pares a physical system with Hilbert space HA, which
has an arbitrary size, in one of four states ρˆ(a, g) with
probability pa,g; a = 0, 1 labels Alice’s basis choice and
g = 0, 1 is the value of her key bit. The choice of a is
assumed to be completely random: pa,0+pa,1 = 1/2. We
assume that the states satisfy
p0,0 ρˆ(0, 0) + p0,1 ρˆ(0, 1) = p1,0 ρˆ(1, 0) + p1,1 ρˆ(1, 1),
(1)
which is vital in the security proof. A convenient way
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to prepare such an ensemble is to introduce an auxiliary
system A′ with Hilbert space HA′ . Alice first prepares
HA⊗HA′ in an entangled state ρˆAA′ , and then performs
a measurement Ma on system A
′ alone. The measure-
ment Ma gives a binary outcome, determining g. Eq. (1)
is then satisfied because the choice of the measurement,
M0 or M1, does not affect the marginal state of HA.
Hence, if the source is realized in this way, there is no
need to carry out tests to characterize its performance.
As noted in [6], if A′ is a qubit,M0 is a measurement of
σˆz , and M1 is a measurement of σˆx, then security can be
established by the method of Shor and Preskill. But our
security proof invokes only the condition (1); no further
properties of ρˆAA′ , M0, or M1 need be specified.
At the end of the transmission channelHA → HB, Bob
switches between two measurements on HB. We assume
that the two measurements are modeled by a common
quantum channel HB → H2, where dimH2 = 2, followed
by the measurement of the Pauli operator σˆz or σˆx. In the
security proof, we include the common quantum channel
in the transmission channel between Alice and Bob, so
that Bob receives a qubit at the end of the channel.
The protocol that we shall prove to be secure is the
following: Let Ω ≡ {1, . . . , 4N(1 + ǫ)}. The variable de-
noted by a¯ takes the value opposite to a.
Protocol 1 (BB84) — (1) Alice creates random bit se-
quences {ai} and {gi} for i ∈ Ω. Alice randomly chooses
a subset R ⊂ Ω with size |R| = 2N(1 + ǫ). (2) Bob
creates a random bit sequence {bi}. (3) When i ∈ R,
Alice sends ρˆ(ai, gi). When i ∈ R¯(≡ Ω−R), Alice sends
ρˆ(a¯i, gi). (4) Bob measures σˆz when bi = 0, and measures
σˆx when bi = 1. For either case, he sets bit hi according
to the outcome (hi = 0 for outcome 1 and hi = 1 for
outcome −1). (5) Bob announces {bi}. Alice announces
{ai} and R. If the size of T ≡ {i ∈ R|ai = bi} is less
than N , the protocol aborts. Bob decides randomly on a
subset S ⊂ {i ∈ R¯|a¯i = bi} with |S| = N and announces
(if he cannot do this, the protocol aborts). (6) Alice and
Bob compare gi and hi for i ∈ T and determine the error
rate δ. If δ is too large, the protocol aborts. (7) Bob
randomizes the positions of the N qubits in S by a per-
mutation π and announces π. Bob announces a linear
code C with |C| = 2r that corrects N(δ+ ǫ) errors occur-
ring in random positions with probability exponentially
close to unity. (8) The sifted key κsif of length N is de-
fined as the sequence {hi}i∈S . The final key is the coset
κsif + C
⊥. (9) Alice obtains κsif by applying an error
correction scheme to {gi}i∈S via encrypted communica-
tion with Bob, consuming τ bits of the previously shared
secret key. Then Alice obtains the final key.
Protocol 1 is the standard BB84 protocol, except for
the use of a¯i in place of ai in steps (3) and (5), which
we have adopted for later convenience in the proof. The
random permutation π in step (7) is redundant, since it
suffices to choose the code C randomly instead of doing
the permutation. In the limit of large N , the achiev-
able r/N reaches 1− h(δ) (where h(δ) = −δ log2 δ− (1−
δ) log2(1 − δ) is the binary entropy function), and τ/N
in step (9) approaches h(δ), resulting in the rate of key
generation 1− 2h(δ).
Our proof uses some basic properties of (classical)
error-correcting codes. The linear code C appearing in
step (7) is an r-dimensional subspace of the binary vec-
tor space FN2 . The code C
⊥ appearing in step (8) is the
orthogonal complement of C, called the dual of C. We
can specify a linear coding function G : Fr2 → FN2 , which
assigns a distinct codeword of C to each binary sequence
of length r. We have assumed in the protocol that C cor-
rects N(δ+ ǫ) errors occurring in random positions with
probability exponentially close to unity. More specifi-
cally, there exists a set of correctable errors E ⊂ FN2 and
a decoding function f : FN2 → Fr2, satisfying
f(G(y) + x) = y (2)
for any y ∈ Fr2 and any x ∈ E . A random error with
weight at most N(δ + ǫ) belongs to E with probability
exponentially close to unity. The function f is not nec-
essarily linear and may be hard to compute, but we will
need only its existence for the proof of security — Bob
does not compute f in the actual protocol.
What Bob actually calculates is the coset κsif + C
⊥
in step (8). One way to do this is to use the function
GT : FN2 → Fr2, which is the adjoint (matrix transpose)
of G satisfying GT (x) · y = x · G(y) (mod 2) for any
x ∈ FN2 and y ∈ Fr2. Since the kernel of GT (x) is C⊥,
the final key is the r-bit sequence GT (κsif). The duality
between G and GT will play an important role in the
security proof below.
In order to prove that protocol 1 is secure, we need to
show that Eve’s maximum knowledge I1 about the final
key is negligible. Note that Bob’s final key is determined
at step (8); step (9), which assures that Alice’s key agrees
with Bob’s and leaks no information to Eve, is not rele-
vant to I1. Let us compare Protocol 1 with a modified
one:
Protocol 2 — (3)′ When i ∈ R, Alice sends ρˆ(ai, gi).
When i ∈ R¯, Alice also sends ρˆ(ai, gi). The other steps
are the same as Protocol 1.
This modification follows Mayers’s argument [2] except
for the exchanged roles of the sender and the receiver.
The only difference between protocols 1 and 2 is a flip
in Alice’s basis for i ∈ R¯. But the bits {gi} for i ∈ R¯
are kept secret by Alice. Hence, for Eve and Bob only
the state averaged over {gi} is relevant, and this state is
identical for the two protocols by the condition Eq. (1).
Therefore, Eve’s maximum knowledge I2 about Bob’s fi-
nal key in Protocol 2 is the same as I1.
Next, let us further modify Protocol 2 in favor of Eve,
by allowing Eve to control Alice’s source. Now Eve knows
{ai} and {gi} and is free to prepare the states measured
by Bob however she pleases. Since the states ρˆ(ai, gi)
have been removed from the protocol and Bob’s mea-
surements are symmetric in bi, the protocol is completely
symmetric in {ai} and {gi}. Therefore we may assume
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ai = gi = 0 without loss of generality. The resulting
protocol is as follows:
Protocol 3 — (1) Alice randomly chooses a subset
R ⊂ Ω with size |R| = 2N(1 + ǫ). (2) Bob creates a
random bit sequence {bi}. (3) Eve prepares Bob’s qubits
and her ancilla system in a state. (4) Bob measures σˆz
when bi = 0, and measures σˆx when bi = 1. For either
case, he sets the bit hi according to the outcome. (5)
Bob announces {bi}. Alice announces R. If the size of
T ≡ {i ∈ R|bi = 0} is less than N , the protocol aborts.
Bob decides randomly on a subset S ⊂ {i ∈ R¯|bi = 1}
with |S| = N and announces (if he cannot do this, the
protocol aborts). (6) Bob counts the number n of bits
with hi = 1 for i ∈ T and determines the error rate
δ = n/|T |. If δ is too large, the protocol aborts. (7)
Bob randomizes the positions of the N qubits in S by a
permutation π and announces π. Bob announces a linear
code C. (8) The sifted key κsif of length N is defined as
{hi}i∈S . The final key is the coset κsif + C⊥.
Since the modifications in the protocol favor Eve, Eve’s
maximum knowledge I3 about the final key in Protocol
3 is no less than I2: thus I1 = I2 ≤ I3. To complete
the proof, we will show that I3 is small — Eve cannot
predict Bob’s key accurately because Bob is measuring
in the “wrong” basis.
Let us denote the Hilbert space of Eve’s system as HE
and that of the N qubits belonging to S as HS . We may
imagine that Bob’s measurement on set S is delayed un-
til step (8), and denote by ρˆ the state over HS ⊗ HE
after the verification test on the set T is done, but before
the qubits in S are measured. The test on T finds that
the rate of error (σˆz = −1) over N (or more) randomly
chosen qubits is δ. If the qubits in the set S were also
measured in the σz-basis, then the joint probability of
finding an error rate less than δ in T and finding more
than N(δ + ǫ) errors in S would be asymptotically less
than exp[−ǫ2N/4(δ−δ2)] for any strategy by Eve. Ignor-
ing any inefficient strategy that has only an exponentially
small probability of giving an error rate less than δ in T ,
we conclude that for the state ρˆ, the probability of finding
more than N(δ + ǫ) errors in S is exponentially small.
Let {|v〉Z , v ∈ FN2 } denote the “Z-basis” of HS , where
the value of the j-th bit of v corresponds to the eigen-
value of σˆz on the j-th qubit, and let {|v〉X = HˆN |v〉Z}
denote the “X-basis,” where HˆN is the Hadamard trans-
formation acting on the N qubits. The announcement of
π in step (7) can be described as the transmission from
Bob to Eve of a particle J in one of N ! orthogonal states
{|π〉J}. The symmetrized state held by Bob and Eve after
transmission of the particle is
ρˆs = (N !)
−1
∑
pi
|π〉J〈π| ⊗ (Uˆpi ⊗ 1ˆE)ρˆ(Uˆ †pi ⊗ 1ˆE). (3)
Let PˆE be the projection of HS onto the subspace
spanned by the states |e〉Z such that e ∈ E . The suc-
cessful verification test ensures that the probability of
finding an error pattern that is not in E is exponentially
small: Tr[(PˆE ⊗ 1ˆE)ρˆs] ≥ 1 − η, where η is an exponen-
tially small number. (We are now regarding the particle
J as part of Eve’s system E.) If we define ρˆ′ as
ρˆ′ ≡ (PˆE ⊗ 1ˆE)ρˆs(PˆE ⊗ 1ˆE)
Tr[(PˆE ⊗ 1ˆE)ρˆs]
, (4)
its fidelity [7] to ρˆs, F (ρˆ
′, ρˆs) ≡ [Tr(
√
ρˆ′ρˆs
√
ρˆ′)1/2]2, is
given by
F (ρˆ′, ρˆs) = Tr[(PˆE ⊗ 1ˆE)ρˆs] ≥ 1− η. (5)
In what follows, we will show that if the state ρˆ′ instead
of ρˆs were used, Eve would have no information about
the final key (I3 = 0). Then we will infer that any actual
strategy by Eve (that passes the verification test with
a probability that is not exponentially small) gives her
exponentially small information.
In Protocol 3, Bob measures in the Z-basis for the veri-
fication test, and in the X-basis to generate the key — we
need to show that if the error rate is low in the Z-basis,
then the key is random and private. Our proof invokes
a quantum circuit that outputs the same r-bit final key
as Bob finds in Protocol 3, and that also expunges Eve’s
entanglement with the key bits. Though Bob might not
have actually executed this circuit, it would be all the
same to Eve if he had, which is sufficient to ensure pri-
vacy.
The circuit, shown in Fig. 1, uses an auxiliary system
Q of r qubits initially prepared in the state |0〉X , and is a
composition Uˆ ≡ Uˆ2Uˆ1 of two unitary operators Uˆ1 and
Uˆ2. The operator Uˆ1, which calculates the final key, acts
in the X-basis as
Uˆ1 : |x〉X ⊗ |y〉X → |x〉X ⊗ |y +GT (x)〉X . (6)
Using the duality between G and GT , we easily see that
U1 acts in the Z-basis as
Uˆ1 : |x〉Z ⊗ |y〉Z → |x+G(y)〉Z ⊗ |y〉Z . (7)
The operator Uˆ2 is defined in the Z-basis as
Uˆ2 : |x〉Z ⊗ |y〉Z → |x〉Z ⊗ |y + f(x)〉Z , (8)
and in the X-basis acts as
Uˆ2 : |x〉X ⊗ |y〉X → |Ψx,y〉X ⊗ |y〉X . (9)
Here |Ψx,y〉 is a rather complicated state of HS , but its
exact form is not relevant here.
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y
y
0
Uˆ1 Uˆ1Uˆ2 Uˆ2
FIG. 1. (a) A quantum circuit calculating κfin = G
T (κsif) in the X-basis. (b) The same circuit in the Z-basis. When x ∈ E ,
the final state of system Q is |0〉Z .
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If the initial state of the ancilla Q is |0〉X , then from
Eqs. (6) and (9) we have
Uˆ(|κsif〉X ⊗ |0〉X) = |Ψx,κfin〉X ⊗ |GT (κsif)〉X ; (10)
the final key κfin = G
T (κsif) is obtained by measuring
the system Q in theX-basis after execution of the circuit.
On the other hand, Eqs. (7) and (8) with |0〉X ∝
∑
y |y〉Z
lead to
Uˆ(|x〉Z ⊗ |0〉X)
∝
∑
y
|x+G(y)〉Z ⊗ |y + f(x+G(y))〉Z ; (11)
if the initial state |x〉Z satisfies x ∈ E , the final state of Q
is |0〉Z , due to Eq. (2). Then, Eq. (4) ensures that if the
initial state of HS ⊗HE is ρˆ′, the final marginal state of
Q is still |0〉Z . Therefore, the final state ρˆQ of Q obtained
when we start from the actual state ρˆs is exponentially
close to |0〉Z :
Z〈0|ρˆQ|0〉Z ≥ F (ρˆ′, ρˆs) ≥ 1− η. (12)
Eq. (12) establishes that the final key can be obtained
from a complete X-basis measurement on the state ρˆQ,
whose fidelity to the Z-basis eigenstate |0〉Z is exponen-
tially close to unity. From this, we conclude the fol-
lowing: (a) The mutual information I3 between the fi-
nal key and Eve, who may conduct any measurement
on her system, is upper-bounded by the von Neumann
entropy S(ρˆQ) [8]. Since ρˆQ has an eigenvalue greater
than or equal to 1 − η, we have I1 ≤ I3 ≤ S(ρˆQ) ≤
h(η) + η log2(2
r − 1) < h(η) + rη. (b) The probabil-
ity distribution py over the 2
r final keys is very close to
uniform. In fact, the fidelity to the uniform distribu-
tion cannot be lower than the fidelity in Eq. (12). Thus
we have 2−r(
∑
y
√
py)
2 ≥ 1 − η. Using the inequality
−2 log2 x ≤ r(1 − x)2 + (1− x2)/(loge 2) which holds for
x ≥ 2−r/2 when r is large, the Shannon entropy of {py}
is bounded as H({py}) = r + 2
∑
y py log2(2
rpy)
−1/2 ≥
r(2
√
1− η − 1) ≥ r(1 − 2η).
The two imperfections of the final key derived in (a)
and (b) can be combined into a single parameter by the
following argument. Let us assume that Bob randomly
chooses and announces a bit sequence w ∈ Fr2, and pro-
duces a new key w + y which is truly uniformly dis-
tributed. If Eve’s information about y is I1, then her
information about w + y is
I = r −H({py}) + I1 < 3rη + h(η), (13)
which is also exponentially small, concluding the proof.
Finally, suppose that Bob uses a detector with imper-
fect efficiency, which has a “null” outcome (signifying
a detection failure) in addition to the valid binary out-
come. Our proof remains valid, provided that the effi-
ciency (probability of obtaining a valid outcome) is the
same for the two bases, and the size of Ω is increased
appropriately.
Our proof of security applies to an uncharacterized
source with basis-independent averaged states. By in-
terchanging the roles of sender and receiver, the same
proof can be applied to the case of an uncharacterized
detector, considered by Mayers [2]. Indeed, in that case
our proof allows a more general source (one triggered by
a perfect measurement on half of an entangled state, as
opposed to a perfect source) and a higher rate of key
generation (1− 2h(δ) rather than 1− h(δ)− h(2δ)) than
established by Mayers. In either case, by exploiting the
duality between the operation that encodes a message
using C and the operation that computes a C⊥ coset,
our proof illuminates the connection between a low error
rate and successful privacy amplification.
It is also interesting to consider characterized imperfect
sources and detectors that have limited basis-dependent
flaws. One important case of a characterized defective
source, recently analyzed in [9], is a source that occasion-
ally emits two identical copies of a qubit, one of which
can be intercepted by Eve. In this case, our proof does
not apply because Eq. (1) is not satisfied. Security cri-
teria for characterized sources and detectors are further
discussed in [10].
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